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1 Introduction
Collectively, machine learning (ML) researchers are engaged in the creation and dissemination of
knowledge about data-driven algorithms. In a given paper, researchers might aspire to any subset
of the following goals, among others: to theoretically characterize what is learnable, to obtain
understanding through empirically rigorous experiments, or to build a working system that has high
predictive accuracy. While determining which knowledge warrants inquiry may be subjective, once
the topic is fixed, papers are most valuable to the community when they act in service of the reader,
creating foundational knowledge and communicating as clearly as possible.
What sort of papers best serve their readers? We can enumerate desirable characteristics: these
papers should (i) provide intuition to aid the reader’s understanding, but clearly distinguish it from
stronger conclusions supported by evidence; (ii) describe empirical investigations that consider and
rule out alternative hypotheses [62]; (iii) make clear the relationship between theoretical analysis and
intuitive or empirical claims [64]; and (iv) use language to empower the reader, choosing terminology
to avoid misleading or unproven connotations, collisions with other definitions, or conflation with
other related but distinct concepts [56].
Recent progress in machine learning comes despite frequent departures from these ideals. In this
paper, we focus on the following four patterns that appear to us to be trending in ML scholarship:
1. Failure to distinguish between explanation and speculation.
2. Failure to identify the sources of empirical gains, e.g. emphasizing unnecessary modifications
to neural architectures when gains actually stem from hyper-parameter tuning.
3. Mathiness: the use of mathematics that obfuscates or impresses rather than clarifies, e.g. by
confusing technical and non-technical concepts.
4. Misuse of language, e.g. by choosing terms of art with colloquial connotations or by overloading
established technical terms.
While the causes behind these patterns are uncertain, possibilities include the rapid expansion
of the community, the consequent thinness of the reviewer pool, and the often-misaligned incen-
tives between scholarship and short-term measures of success (e.g. bibliometrics, attention, and
entrepreneurial opportunity). While each pattern offers a corresponding remedy (don’t do it), we
also discuss some speculative suggestions for how the community might combat these trends.
As the impact of machine learning widens, and the audience for research papers increasingly
includes students, journalists, and policy-makers, these considerations apply to this wider audience
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as well. We hope that by communicating more precise information with greater clarity, we can
accelerate the pace of research, reduce the on-boarding time for new researchers, and play a more
constructive role in the public discourse.
Flawed scholarship threatens to mislead the public and stymie future research by compromising
ML’s intellectual foundations. Indeed, many of these problems have recurred cyclically throughout
the history of artificial intelligence and, more broadly, in scientific research. In 1976, Drew Mc-
Dermott [53] chastised the AI community for abandoning self-discipline, warning prophetically that
“if we can’t criticize ourselves, someone else will save us the trouble”. Similar discussions recurred
throughout the 80s, 90s, and aughts [13, 38, 2]. In other fields such as psychology, poor experimen-
tal standards have eroded trust in the discipline’s authority [14]. The current strength of machine
learning owes to a large body of rigorous research to date, both theoretical [22, 7, 19] and empirical
[34, 25, 5]. By promoting clear scientific thinking and communication, we can sustain the trust and
investment currently enjoyed by our community.
2 Disclaimers
This paper aims to instigate discussion, answering a call for papers from the ICML Machine Learning
Debates workshop. While we stand by the points represented here, we do not purport to offer a full
or balanced viewpoint or to discuss the overall quality of science in ML. In many aspects, such as
reproducibility, the community has advanced standards far beyond what sufficed a decade ago. We
note that these arguments are made by us, against us, by insiders offering a critical introspective look,
not as sniping outsiders. The ills that we identify are not specific to any individual or institution. We
ourselves have fallen into these patterns, and likely will again in the future. Exhibiting one of these
patterns doesn’t make a paper bad nor does it indict the paper’s authors, however we believe that
all papers could be made stronger by avoiding these patterns. While we provide concrete examples,
our guiding principles are to (i) implicate ourselves, and (ii) to preferentially select from the work of
better-established researchers and institutions that we admire, to avoid singling out junior students
for whom inclusion in this discussion might have consequences and who lack the opportunity to
reply symmetrically. We are grateful to belong to a community that provides sufficient intellectual
freedom to allow us to express critical perspectives.
3 Troubling Trends
In each subsection below, we (i) describe a trend; (ii) provide several examples (as well as positive
examples that resist the trend); and (iii) explain the consequences. Pointing to weaknesses in
individual papers can be a sensitive topic. To minimize this, we keep examples short and specific.
3.1 Explanation vs. Speculation
Research into new areas often involves exploration predicated on intuitions that have yet to coalesce
into crisp formal representations. We recognize the role of speculation as a means for authors to
impart intuitions that may not yet withstand the full weight of scientific scrutiny. However, papers
often offer speculation in the guise of explanations, which are then interpreted as authoritative due
to the trappings of a scientific paper and the presumed expertise of the authors.
For instance, [33] forms an intuitive theory around a concept called internal covariate shift.
The exposition on internal covariate shift, starting from the abstract, appears to state technical
facts. However, key terms are not made crisp enough to conclusively assume a truth value. For
example, the paper states that batch normalization offers improvements by reducing changes in the
distribution of hidden activations over the course of training. By which divergence measure is this
change quantified? The paper never clarifies, and some work suggests that this explanation of batch
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normalization may be off the mark [65]. Nevertheless, the speculative explanation given in [33] has
been repeated as fact, e.g. in [60], which states, “It is well-known that a deep neural network is very
hard to optimize due to the internal-covariate-shift problem.”
We ourselves have been equally guilty of speculation disguised as explanation. In [72], JS writes
that “the high dimensionality and abundance of irrelevant features. . . give the attacker more room
to construct attacks”, without conducting any experiments to measure the effect of dimensionality
on attackability. And in [71], JS introduces the intuitive notion of coverage without defining it,
and uses it as a form of explanation, e.g.: “Recall that one symptom of a lack of coverage is poor
estimates of uncertainty and the inability to generate high precision predictions.” Looking back, we
desired to communicate insufficiently fleshed out intuitions that were material to the work described
in the paper, and we were reticent to label a core part of our argument as speculative.
In contrast to the above examples, [69] separates speculation from fact. While this paper, which
introduced dropout regularization, speculates at length on connections between dropout and sexual
reproduction, a designated “Motivation” section clearly quarantines this discussion. This practice
avoids confusing readers while allowing authors to express informal ideas.
In another positive example, [3] presents practical guidelines for training neural networks. Here,
the authors carefully convey uncertainty. Instead of presenting the guidelines as authoritative,
the paper states: “Although such recommendations come. . . from years of experimentation and to
some extent mathematical justification, they should be challenged. They constitute a good starting
point. . . but very often have not been formally validated, leaving open many questions that can be
answered either by theoretical analysis or by solid comparative experimental work”.
3.2 Failure to Identify the Sources of Empirical Gains
The machine learning peer review process places a premium on technical novelty. Perhaps to satisfy
reviewers, many papers emphasize both complex models (addressed here) and fancy mathematics
(see §3.3). While complex models are sometimes justified, empirical advances often come about
in other ways: through clever problem formulations, scientific experiments, optimization heuristics,
data preprocessing techniques, extensive hyper-parameter tuning, or by applying existing methods
to interesting new tasks. Sometimes a number of proposed techniques together achieve a significant
empirical result. In these cases, it serves the reader to elucidate which techniques are necessary to
realize the reported gains.
Too frequently, authors propose many tweaks absent proper ablation studies, obscuring the
source of empirical gains. Sometimes just one of the changes is actually responsible for the improved
results. This can give the false impression that the authors did more work (by proposing several
improvements), when in fact they did not do enough (by not performing proper ablations). Moreover,
this practice misleads readers to believe that all of the proposed changes are necessary.
Recently, Melis et al. [54] demonstrated that a series of published improvements, originally
attributed to complex innovations in network architectures, were actually due to better hyper-
parameter tuning. On equal footing, vanilla LSTMs, hardly modified since 1997 [32], topped the
leaderboard. The community may have benefited more by learning the details of the hyper-parameter
tuning without the distractions. Similar evaluation issues have been observed for deep reinforcement
learning [30] and generative adversarial networks [51]. See [68] for more discussion of lapses in
empirical rigor and resulting consequences.
In contrast, many papers perform good ablation analyses [41, 45, 77, 82], and even retrospective
attempts to isolate the source of gains can lead to new discoveries [10, 65]. Furthermore, ablation
is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding a method, and can even be impractical given
computational constraints. Understanding can also come from robustness checks (as in [15], which
discovers that existing language models handle inflectional morphology poorly) as well as qualitative
error analysis [40].
Empirical study aimed at understanding can be illuminating even absent a new algorithm. For
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instance, probing the behavior of neural networks led to identifying their susceptibility to adversarial
perturbations [74]. Careful study also often reveals limitations of challenge datasets while yielding
stronger baselines. [11] studies a task designed for reading comprehension of news passages and finds
that 73% of the questions can be answered by looking at a single sentence, while only 2% require
looking at multiple sentences (the remaining 25% of examples were either ambiguous or contained
coreference errors). In addition, simpler neural networks and linear classifiers outperformed compli-
cated neural architectures that had previously been evaluated on this task. In the same spirit, [80]
analyzes and constructs a strong baseline for the Visual Genome Scene Graphs dataset.
3.3 Mathiness
When writing a paper early in PhD, we (ZL) received feedback from an experienced post-doc that the
paper needed more equations. The post-doc wasn’t endorsing the system, but rather communicating
a sober view of how reviewing works. More equations, even when difficult to decipher, tend to
convince reviewers of a paper’s technical depth.
Mathematics is an essential tool for scientific communication, imparting precision and clarity
when used correctly. However, not all ideas and claims are amenable to precise mathematical
description, and natural language is an equally indispensible tool for communicating, especially
about intuitive or empirical claims.
When mathematical and natural language statements are mixed without a clear accounting of
their relationship, both the prose and the theory can suffer: problems in the theory can be concealed
by vague definitions, while weak arguments in the prose can be bolstered by the appearance of
technical depth. We refer to this tangling of formal and informal claims as mathiness, following
economist Paul Romer who described the pattern thusly: “Like mathematical theory, mathiness
uses a mixture of words and symbols, but instead of making tight links, it leaves ample room for
slippage between statements in natural language versus formal language” [64].
Mathiness manifests in several ways: First, some papers abuse mathematics to convey technical
depth—to bulldoze rather than to clarify. Spurious theorems are common culprits, inserted into
papers to lend authoritativeness to empirical results, even when the theorem’s conclusions do not
actually support the main claims of the paper. We (JS) are guilty of this in [70], where a discussion
of “staged strong Doeblin chains” has limited relevance to the proposed learning algorithm, but
might confer a sense of theoretical depth to readers.
The ubiquity of this issue is evidenced by the paper introducing the Adam optimizer [35]. In
the course of introducing an optimizer with strong empirical performance, it also offers a theorem
regarding convergence in the convex case, which is perhaps unnecessary in an applied paper focusing
on non-convex optimization. The proof was later shown to be incorrect in [63].
A second issue is claims that are neither clearly formal nor clearly informal. For example, [18]
argues that the difficulty in optimizing neural networks stems not from local minima but from saddle
points. As one piece of evidence, the work cites a statistical physics paper [9] on Gaussian random
fields and states that in high dimensions “all local minima [of Gaussian random fields] are likely to
have an error very close to that of the global minimum” (a similar statement appears in the related
work of [12]). This appears to be a formal claim, but absent a specific theorem it is difficult to verify
the claimed result or to determine its precise content. Our understanding is that it is partially a
numerical claim that the gap is small for typical settings of the problem parameters, as opposed
to a claim that the gap vanishes in high dimensions. A formal statement would help clarify this.
We note that the broader interesting point in [18] that minima tend to have lower loss than saddle
points is more clearly stated and empirically tested.
Finally, some papers invoke theory in overly broad ways, or make passing references to theorems
with dubious pertinence. For instance, the no free lunch theorem is commonly invoked as a justifi-
cation for using heuristic methods without guarantees, even though the theorem does not formally
preclude guaranteed learning procedures.
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While the best remedy for mathiness is to avoid it, some papers go further with exemplary
exposition. A recent paper [8] on counterfactual reasoning covers a large amount of mathematical
ground in a down-to-earth manner, with numerous clear connections to applied empirical problems.
This tutorial, written in clear service to the reader, has helped to spur work in the burgeoning
community studying counterfactual reasoning for ML.
3.4 Misuse of Language
We identify three common avenues of language misuse in machine learning: suggestive definitions,
overloaded terminology, and suitcase words.
3.4.1 Suggestive Definitions
In the first avenue, a new technical term is coined that has a suggestive colloquial meaning, thus
sneaking in connotations without the need to argue for them. This often manifests in anthropo-
morphic characterizations of tasks (reading comprehension [31] and music composition [59]) and
techniques (curiosity [66] and fear [48]). A number of papers name components of proposed models
in a manner suggestive of human cognition, e.g. “thought vectors” [36] and the “consciousness prior”
[4]. Our goal is not to rid the academic literature of all such language; when properly qualified, these
connections might communicate a fruitful source of inspiration. However, when a suggestive term is
assigned technical meaning, each subsequent paper has no choice but to confuse its readers, either
by embracing the term or by replacing it.
Describing empirical results with loose claims of “human-level” performance can also portray
a false sense of current capabilities. Take, for example, the “dermatologist-level classification of
skin cancer” reported in [21]. The comparison to dermatologists conceals the fact that classifiers
and dermatologists perform fundamentally different tasks. Real dermatologists encounter a wide
variety of circumstances and must perform their jobs despite unpredictable changes. The machine
classifier, however, only achieves low error on i.i.d. test data. In contrast, claims of human-level
performance in [29] are better-qualified to refer to the ImageNet classification task (rather than
object recognition more broadly). Even in this case, one careful paper (among many less careful
[21, 57, 75]) was insufficient to put the public discourse back on track. Popular articles continue
to characterize modern image classifiers as “surpassing human abilities and effectively proving that
bigger data leads to better decisions” [23], despite demonstrations that these networks rely on
spurious correlations, e.g. misclassifying “Asians dressed in red” as ping-pong balls [73].
Deep learning papers are not the sole offenders; misuse of language plagues many subfields of
ML. [49] discusses how the recent literature on fairness in ML often overloads terminology bor-
rowed from complex legal doctrine, such as disparate impact, to name simple equations expressing
particular notions of statistical parity. This has resulted in a literature where “fairness”, “opportu-
nity”, and “discrimination” denote simple statistics of predictive models, confusing researchers who
become oblivious to the difference, and policymakers who become misinformed about the ease of
incorporating ethical desiderata into ML.
3.4.2 Overloading Technical Terminology
A second avenue of misuse consists of taking a term that holds precise technical meaning and
using it in an imprecise or contradictory way. Consider the case of deconvolution, which formally
describes the process of reversing a convolution, but is now used in the deep learning literature to
refer to transpose convolutions (also called up-convolutions) as commonly found in auto-encoders
and generative adversarial networks. This term first took root in deep learning in [79], which does
address deconvolution, but was later over-generalized to refer to any neural architectures using
upconvolutions [78, 50]. Such overloading of terminology can create lasting confusion. New machine
learning papers referring to deconvolution might be (i) invoking its original meaning, (ii) describing
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upconvolution, or (iii) attempting to resolve the confusion, as in [28], which awkwardly refers to
“upconvolution (deconvolution)”.
As another example, generative models are traditionally models of either the input distribution
p(x) or the joint distribution p(x, y). In contrast, discriminative models address the conditional
distribution p(y | x) of the label given the inputs. However, in recent works, “generative model”
imprecisely refers to any model that produces realistic-looking structured data. On the surface, this
may seem consistent with the p(x) definition, but it obscures several shortcomings—for instance,
the inability of GANs or VAEs to perform conditional inference (e.g. sampling from p(x2 | x1) where
x1 and x2 are two distinct input features). Bending the term further, some discriminative models
are now referred to as generative models on account of producing structured outputs [76], a mistake
that we (ZL) make in [47]. Seeking to resolve the confusion and provide historical context, [58]
distinguishes between prescribed and implicit generative models.
Revisiting batch normalization, [33] describes covariate shift as a change in the distribution of
model inputs. In fact, covariate shift refers to a specific type of shift where although the input
distribution p(x) might change, the labeling function p(y|x) does not [27]. Moreover, due to the
influence of [33], Google Scholar lists batch normalization as the first reference on searches for
“covariate shift”.
Among the consequences of mis-using language is that (as with generative models) we might
conceal lack of progress by redefining an unsolved task to refer to something easier. This often
combines with suggestive definitions via anthropomorphic naming. Language understanding and
reading comprehension, once grand challenges of AI, now refer to making accurate predictions on
specific datasets [31].
3.4.3 Suitcase Words
Finally, we discuss the overuse of suitcase words in ML papers. Coined by Minsky in the 2007 book
The Emotion Machine [56], suitcase words pack together a variety of meanings. Minsky describes
mental processes such as consciousness, thinking, attention, emotion, and feeling that may not share
“a single cause or origin”. Many terms in ML fall into this category. For example, [46] notes that
interpretability holds no universally agreed-upon meaning, and often references disjoint methods and
desiderata. As a consequence, even papers that appear to be in dialogue with each other may have
different concepts in mind.
As another example, generalization has both a specific technical meaning (generalizing from train
to test) and a more colloquial meaning that is closer to the notion of transfer (generalizing from one
population to another) or of external validity (generalizing from an experimental setting to the real
world) [67]. Conflating these notions leads to overestimating the capabilities of current systems.
Suggestive definitions and overloaded terminology can contribute to the creation of new suit-
case words. In the fairness literature, where legal, philosophical, and statistical language are often
overloaded, terms like bias become suitcase words that must be subsequently unpacked [17].
In common speech and as aspirational terms, suitcase words can serve a useful purpose. Perhaps
the suitcase word reflects an overarching concept that unites the various meanings. For example,
artificial intelligence might be well-suited as an aspirational name to organize an academic depart-
ment. On the other hand, using suitcase words in technical arguments can lead to confusion. For
example, [6] writes an equation (Box 4) involving the terms intelligence and optimization power,
implicitly assuming that these suitcase words can be quantified with a one-dimensional scalar.
4 Speculation on Causes Behind the Trends
Do the above patterns represent a trend, and if so, what are the underlying causes? We speculate
that these patterns are on the rise and suspect several possible causal factors: complacency in the
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face of progress, the rapid expansion of the community, the consequent thinness of the reviewer pool,
and misaligned incentives of scholarship vs. short-term measures of success.
4.1 Complacency in the Face of Progress
The apparent rapid progress in ML has at times engendered an attitude that strong results excuse
weak arguments. Authors with strong results may feel licensed to insert arbitrary unsupported stories
(see §3.1) regarding the factors driving the results, to omit experiments aimed at disentangling those
factors (§3.2), to adopt exaggerated terminology (§3.4), or to take less care to avoid mathiness (§3.3).
At the same time, the single-round nature of the reviewing process may cause reviewers to feel
they have no choice but to accept papers with strong quantitative findings. Indeed, even if the
paper is rejected, there is no guarantee the flaws will be fixed or even noticed in the next cycle, so
reviewers may conclude that accepting a flawed paper is the best option.
4.2 Growing Pains
Since around 2012, the ML community has expanded rapidly due to increased popularity stemming
from the success of deep learning methods. While we view the rapid expansion of the community as
a positive development, it can also have side effects.
To protect junior authors, we have preferentially referenced our own papers and those of es-
tablished researchers. However, newer researchers may be more susceptible to these patterns. For
instance, authors unaware of previous terminology are more likely to mis-use or re-define language
(§3.4). On the other hand, experienced researchers fall into these patterns as well.
Rapid growth can also thin the reviewer pool, in two ways—by increasing the ratio of submitted
papers to reviewers, and by decreasing the fraction of experienced reviewers. Less experienced
reviewers may be more likely to demand architectural novelty, be fooled by spurious theorems,
and let pass serious but subtle issues like misuse of language, thus either incentivizing or enabling
several of the trends described above. At the same time, experienced but over-burdened reviewers
may revert to a “check-list” mentality, rewarding more formulaic papers at the expense of more
creative or intellectually ambitious work that might not fit a preconceived template. Moreover,
overworked reviewers may not have enough time to fix—or even to notice—all of the issues in a
submitted paper.
4.3 Misaligned Incentives
Reviewers are not alone in providing poor incentives for authors. As ML research garners increased
media attention and ML startups become commonplace, to some degree incentives are provided by
the press (“What will they write about?”) and by investors (“What will they invest in?”). The
media provides incentives for some of these trends. Anthropomorphic descriptions of ML algorithms
provide fodder for popular coverage. Take for instance [55], which characterizes an autoencoder as
a “simulated brain”. Hints of human-level performance tend to be sensationalized in newspaper
headlines, e.g. [52], which describes a deep learning image captioning system as “mimicking human
levels of understanding”. Investors too have shown a strong appetite for AI research, funding startups
sometimes on the basis of a single paper. In our (ZL) experience working with investors, they are
sometimes attracted to startups whose research has received media coverage, a dynamic which
attaches financial incentives to media attention. We note that recent interest in chatbot startups co-
occurred with anthropomorphic descriptions of dialogue systems and reinforcement learners both in
papers and in the media, although it may be difficult to determine whether the lapses in scholarship
caused the interest of investors or vice versa.
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5 Suggestions
Supposing we are to intervene to counter these trends, then how? Besides merely suggesting that
each author abstain from these patterns, what can we do as a community to raise the level of
experimental practice, exposition, and theory? And how can we more readily distill the knowledge
of the community and disabuse researchers and the wider public of misconceptions? Below we offer
a number of preliminary suggestions based on our personal experiences and impressions.
5.1 Suggestions for Authors
We encourage authors to ask “what worked?” and “why?”, rather than just “how well?”. Except in
extraordinary cases [39], raw headline numbers provide limited value for scientific progress absent
insight into what drives them. Insight does not necessarily mean theory. Three practices that are
common in the strongest empirical papers are error analysis, ablation studies, and robustness checks
(to e.g. choice of hyper-parameters, as well as ideally to choice of dataset). These practices can be
adopted by everyone and we advocate their wide-spread use. For some examplar papers, we refer
the reader to the preceding discussion in §3.2. [43] also provides a more detailed survey of empirical
best practices.
Sound empirical inquiry need not be confined to tracing the sources of a particular algorithm’s
empirical gains; it can yield new insights even when no new algorithm is proposed. Notable examples
of this include a demonstration that neural networks trained by stochastic gradient descent can fit
randomly-assigned labels [81]. This paper questions the ability of learning-theoretic notions of model
complexity to explain why neural networks can generalize to unseen data. In another example, [26]
explored the loss surfaces of deep networks, revealing that straight-line paths in parameter space
between initialized and learned parameters typically had monotonically decreasing loss.
When writing, we recommend asking the following question: Would I rely on this explanation for
making predictions or for getting a system to work? This can be a good test of whether a theorem is
being included to please reviewers or to convey actual insight. It also helps check whether concepts
and explanations match our own internal mental model. On mathematical writing, we point the
reader to Knuth, Larrabee, and Roberts’ excellent guidebook [37].
Finally, being clear about which problems are open and which are solved not only presents a
clearer picture to readers, it encourages follow-up work and guards against researchers neglecting
questions presumed (falsely) to be resolved.
5.2 Suggestions for Publishers and Reviewers
Reviewers can set better incentives by asking: “Might I have accepted this paper if the authors
had done a worse job?” For instance, a paper describing a simple idea that leads to improved
performance, together with two negative results, should be judged more favorably than a paper that
combines three ideas together (without ablation studies) yielding the same improvement.
Current literature moves fast at the expense of accepting flawed works for conference publication.
One remedy could be to emphasize authoritative retrospective surveys that strip out exaggerated
claims and extraneous material, change anthropomorphic names to sober alternatives, standardize
notation, etc. While venues such as Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning already provide
a track for such work, we feel that there are still not enough strong papers in this genre.
Additionally, we believe (noting our conflict of interest) that critical writing ought to have a
voice at machine learning conferences. Typical ML conference papers choose an established problem
(or propose a new one), demonstrate an algorithm and/or analysis, and report experimental results.
While many questions can be addressed in this way, for addressing the validity of the problems or
the methods of inquiry themselves, neither algorithms nor experiments are sufficient (or appropri-
ate). We would not be alone in embracing greater critical discourse: in NLP, this year’s COLING
8
conference included a call for position papers “to challenge conventional thinking” [1].
There are many lines of further discussion worth pursuing regarding peer review. Are the prob-
lems we described mitigated or exacerbated by open review? How do reviewer point systems align
with the values that we advocate? These topics warrant their own papers and have indeed been
discussed at length elsewhere [42, 44, 24].
6 Discussion
Folk wisdom might suggest not to intervene just as the field is heating up: You can’t argue with
success! We counter these objections with the following arguments: First, many aspects of the
current culture are consequences of ML’s recent success, not its causes. In fact, many of the papers
leading to the current success of deep learning were careful empirical investigations characterizing
principles for training deep networks. This includes the advantage of random over sequential hyper-
parameter search [5], the behavior of different activation functions [34, 25], and an understanding of
unsupervised pre-training [20].
Second, flawed scholarship already negatively impacts the research community and broader public
discourse. We saw in §3 examples of unsupported claims being cited thousands of times, lineages
of purported improvements being overturned by simple baselines, datasets that appear to test high-
level semantic reasoning but actually test low-level syntactic fluency, and terminology confusion that
muddles the academic dialogue. This final issue also affects the public discourse. For instance, the
European parliament passed a report considering regulations to apply if “robots become or are made
self-aware” [16]. While ML researchers are not responsible for all misrepresentations of our work, it
seems likely that anthropomorphic language in authoritative peer-reviewed papers is at least partly
to blame.
We believe that greater rigor in both exposition, science, and theory are essential for both scien-
tific progress and fostering a productive discourse with the broader public. Moreover, as practitioners
apply ML in critical domains such as health, law, and autonomous driving, a calibrated awareness
of the abilities and limits of ML systems will enable us to deploy ML responsibly. We conclude the
paper by discussing several counterarguments and by providing historical context.
6.1 Countervailing Considerations
There are a number of countervailing considerations to the suggestions set forth above. Several
readers of earlier drafts of this paper noted that stochastic gradient descent tends to converge faster
than gradient descent—in other words, perhaps a faster noisier process that ignores our guidelines
for producing “cleaner” papers results in a faster pace of research. For example, the breakthrough
paper on ImageNet classification [39] proposes multiple techniques without ablation studies, several
of which were subsequently determined to be unnecessary. However, at the time the results were so
significant and the experiments so computationally expensive to run that waiting for ablations to
complete was perhaps not worth the cost to the community.
A related concern is that high standards might impede the publication of original ideas, which
are more likely to be unusual and speculative. In other fields, such as economics, high standards
result in a publishing process that can take years for a single paper, with lengthy revision cycles
consuming resources that could be deployed towards new work.
Finally, perhaps there is value in specialization: the researchers generating new conceptual ideas
or building new systems need not be the same ones who carefully collate and distill knowledge.
We recognize the validity of these considerations, and also recognize that these standards are at
times exacting. However, in many cases they are straightforward to implement, requiring only a few
extra days of experiments and more careful writing. Moreover, we present these as strong heuristics
rather than unbreakable rules—if an idea cannot be shared without violating these heuristics, we
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prefer the idea be shared and the heuristics set aside. Additionally, we have almost always found
attempts to adhere to these standards to be well worth the effort. In short, we do not believe that
the research community has achieved a Pareto optimal state on the growth-quality frontier.
6.2 Historical Antecedents
The issues discussed here are neither unique to machine learning nor to this moment in time; they
instead reflect issues that recur cyclically throughout academia. As far back as 1964, the physicist
John R. Platt discussed related concerns in his paper on strong inference [62], where he identified
adherence to specific empirical standards as responsible for the rapid progress of molecular biology
and high-energy physics relative to other areas of science.
There have also been similar discussions in AI. As noted in §1, Drew McDermott [53] criticized a
(mostly pre-ML) AI community in 1976 on a number of issues, including suggestive definitions and a
failure to separate out speculation from technical claims. In 1988, Paul Cohen and Adele Howe [13]
addressed an AI community that at that point “rarely publish[ed] performance evaluations” of their
proposed algorithms and instead only described the systems. They suggested establishing sensible
metrics for quantifying progress, and also analyzing “why does it work?”, “under what circumstances
won’t it work?” and “have the design decisions been justified?”, questions that continue to resonate
today. Finally, in 2009 Armstrong and co-authors [2] discussed the empirical rigor of information
retrieval research, noting a tendency of papers to compare against the same weak baselines, producing
a long series of improvements that did not accumulate to meaningful gains.
In other fields, an unchecked decline in scholarship has led to crisis. A landmark study in 2015
suggested that a significant portion of findings in the psychology literature may not be reproducible
[14]. In a few historical cases, enthusiasm paired with undisciplined scholarship led entire communi-
ties down blind alleys. For example, following the discovery of X-rays, a related discipline on N-rays
emerged [61] before it was eventually debunked.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
The reader might rightly suggest that these problems are self-correcting. We agree. However,
the community self-corrects precisely through recurring debate about what constitutes reasonable
standards for scholarship. We hope that this paper contributes constructively to the discussion.
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